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Abstract
The introduction of a local currency may serve as a signal of de-
mand for local goods. Where demand uncertainty deters ﬁrms from
investing in more productive technologies, such a signal improves the
chances that technology choice will be optimal. The introduction of
a local currency therefore always improves ex-ante eﬃciency and may
lead to ex-post eﬃciency, with strictly higher levels of productivity
and welfare.
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11 Introduction
Less developed areas are typically characterised by low levels of productiv-
ity. In the development economics literature, ﬁrms’ reluctance to invest in
more productive technologies is commonly attributed to the small size of the
domestic market. In some of the earliest works on the subject, Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943) and Nurkse (1953) attribute the persistence of a “low-level
equilibrium” – with low levels of income and productivity – to a lack of co-
ordination in inter-sectoral investment, precipitated by limitations in market
size.1
In this paper, we follow in the tradition of Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurkse
in recognising that insuﬃcient demand may indeed deter local producers
from selecting more productive technologies. However, we propose an al-
ternative reason for ﬁrms’ choice of less productive technologies – demand
uncertainty. That eﬃcient outcomes may be stymied by informational bar-
riers has long been recognised by industrial organisation theorists. It is also
widely recognised that informational imperfections tend to be particularly
severe in developing areas (see Stiglitz, 1989 and Hoﬀ and Stiglitz, 1999 for
an overview).
The eﬀect of informational barriers on product markets in developing
countries to date has, however, been largely restricted to analysis of im-
perfect consumer information regarding product quality. Mayer (1984) and
Grossman and Horn (1988), for example, note that in industries with imper-
fect consumer information regarding product quality, late potential entrants
may be dissuaded from entering because they lack the reputational advantage
that established competitors possess. Since the former are typically situated
in less developed countries, this deters the growth of local industry, even
1They argue that limitations in market size make it unproﬁtable for any one sector to
industrialise, but if all sectors were to industrialise simultaneously, the subsequent increase
in income, and hence demand, would make such investment worthwhile. Although this
has been a notoriously diﬃcult concept to formalise, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989;
Matsuyama, 1992 and Eswaran and Kotwal, 1996 each oﬀer intriguing takes.
2when such growth would be eﬃcient.
Here, rather than focus on imperfect consumer information and its im-
plications for entry, we consider how incomplete ﬁrm information regarding
consumers’ demand for their product aﬀects technology choice. The idea is
simple. A ﬁrm, when faced with a choice of technologies, may be unwilling to
invest in “better” – lower marginal cost – technologies for fear that demand
is insuﬃcient to cover the investment necessary to acquire such technologies.
If the ﬁrm does not expect that demand will be high enough to make such
an investment worthwhile, then it will choose the less productive technology.
Whether such an investment decision is optimal ex-post obviously de-
pends on demand realisations. The ex-post eﬃcient outcome is one in which
the ﬁrm chooses the more productive technology when actual demand is
high, and the less productive technology when actual demand is low. The
potential for ineﬃciency would therefore be attenuated if there existed some
mechanism whereby demand uncertainty could be alleviated. Indeed, even
a partial resolution of demand uncertainty would lead to an enhancement of
ex-ante eﬃciency. We submit that one way of accomplishing this is through
the introduction of a local currency.
There is, of course, a vast literature on multiple currencies dating back to
Mundell’s (1961) seminal contribution. Traditionally, this literature has been
concerned with such issues as goods and factor mobility and the eﬀects of
macroeconomic shocks. This emphasis is not surprising given that countries’
decisions regarding whether or not to introduce domestic currencies tend
to be dominated by concerns about the potential beneﬁts (in terms of say,
employment or growth) of having independent exchange rates or monetary
policies (see Abrams, 1993 and Kalyuzhnova and Tridimas, 1998).
Although we too are interested in the role of multiple currencies in pro-
moting eﬃciency, our focus is on a much more local, subnational level. It
stems from the growing popularity of the use of local scrip in communities
across the world to allegedly “promote local business” or “help the local econ-
omy”. In the last decade or so, over 1,500 such communities have burgeoned.
3One is Ithaca, New York (where these authors happen to reside).2
Local currency institutions themselves are subject to strict national guide-
lines which largely rule out any independence local authorities have regarding
monetary policy or exchange rate regimes. What these local currency insti-
tutions basically do is to oﬀer consumers in the local economies the option of
holding a portion of their wealth in the national currency (say, dollars) and
the remainder in the local currency (called “Hours” in Ithaca). As such, we
are not concerned with such issues as optimal currency areas or the relative
merits of ﬁxed versus ﬂoating exchange rates. Our objective is much more
basic and may be captured in the following thought experiment. Suppose
all individuals initially held money in blue notes. Then how (if at all) might
productivity and welfare be enhanced by allowing each individual to dye as
much of their (blue) money as they wanted, red.
The Ithaca Hours system and most other local currency systems presently
in use have two particularly salient features. First, dollars can be traded for
Hours at a ﬁxed exchange rate, but wealth held in Hours cannot be converted
by consumers into dollars.3 Once held, the only way for consumers to get rid
of Hours is to spend them. Second, whereas dollars are a universally accepted
means of payment, Hours are accepted only at locally owned and operated
businesses. These features pose something of a puzzle in understanding why
consumers are willing to hold Hours at all. What they can purchase using
Hours, they can purchase using dollars, and much more besides. So, one thing
we will be interested in is whether holding Hours is, as intuition suggests, a
“weakly dominated strategy”.
Given that consumers are willing to hold the local currency (and in 1,500
communities they actually are), we argue that it is precisely these features
which account for its role in promoting eﬃcient outcomes. Since they can
only be spent on local goods, local currency holdings serve as a signal of
2See http://ccdev.lets.net/index2.html or http://www.ithacahours.org.
3In the United States, ﬁxed exchange rates are mandated by federal law for tax pur-
poses.
4demand for local products.4 This reduces demand uncertainty and, as we
argued earlier, any such attenuation enhances ex-ante eﬃciency and, in the
case of full-revelation, ex-post eﬃciency.
Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 considers the equilibrium
of a game in which ﬁrms face a technology choice with demand uncertainty
in the absence of a local currency. In section 4, we analyse the equilibrium
of the game with local currency. Section 5 is devoted to seeing, through
an example, how the introduction of a local currency compares to other,
more traditional, policies directed at demand revelation. Finally, section 6
concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an economy consisting of N consumers and one local ﬁrm. Each
consumer’s utility depends on his consumption of a local good (l)a n da
national good (n). Utility, u(l,n;θ)=φ(l;θ)+n, is quasi-linear in the local
good, continuous, strictly quasi-concave, and increasing in both goods. There
are two types of individuals: those who are very fond of the local good – θH,
or “High” types – and those who are not quite as fond of it – θL, or “Low”
types. Let d(p,θ)d e n o t eaθ-type consumer’s utility maximising level of local
goods consumption subject to their budget constraint pl + n ≤ w,w h e r ep
denotes the price of the local good, and w is wealth (and is the same across
all individuals). Then, what distinguishes a high type from a low type is
that at any price p>0, a high type will demand more of the local good
than a low type; that is, d(p,θH) >d (p,θL). Types are distributed i.i.d., and
are private information with the probability of observing a high type being
q where q ∈ (0,1). If q is the expected proportion of high types, therefore,
4To our knowledge, the only other paper which exploits this signalling aspect of mul-
tiple currencies is Kocherlakota and Krueger (1999). However, their principal concern is
why diﬀerent countries may opt for diﬀerent currencies even if they abdicate independent
control of their money supplies.
5aggregate expected demand may be denoted by ED(p;q)=N[qd(p,θH)+
(1 − q)d(p,θL)].5
Before local currency enters the picture, wealth, w, is initially held en-
tirely in the national currency, say dollars (D). With the introduction of a
local currency, individuals will have the option of holding their currency in
any combination of dollars or local money (m), so that w = m+D. However,
local money can be used towards the purchase of local goods but not towards
the purchase of national goods, whereas dollars can be spent on either good.
Holding positive amounts of a local currency which is not readily convert-
ible into dollars therefore commits an individual to the purchase of the local
good.
On the ﬁrm’s side, there is a single local ﬁrm operating in a perfectly
contestable market (p.c.m.) for local goods. The local ﬁrm is risk neutral
and acts as an expected proﬁt maximiser. There is nothing special about
this market structure except that, as we will see in the following section,
it guarantees a downward sloping price expansion path.6 There are two
technology choices available to the local ﬁrm: t ∈{ t1,t 2}. Under t1,t h e
ﬁrm can produce any amount of the good at a constant marginal cost of
c1 > 0. Under t2, the ﬁrm faces a marginal cost of c2 <c 1, but must incur
a per capita ﬁxed cost of F>0. Although the assumption of a per capita
ﬁxed cost is unusual, we employ it in order to capture the idea that ﬁxed
costs to industrial production tend to increase as one moves from smaller
to larger communities. For example, building a factory or buying a plot of
land is likely to be considerably more expensive in a large city than it is in
a rural town. Later on, we will be interested in seeing what happens as N
gets large, so we will want to think about ﬁxed costs rising in proportion
5We allow q to be conditional upon some information; when there is no information,
q = q.
6The analysis would be the same with Bertrand competion. However, Bertrand com-
petition would entail carrying around an extra player without any added insight into the
problem. We could also have had monopolistic or oligopolistic competition, with some
added restrictions on the demand structure.
6to the size of the community. So, if EC(t,p) denotes the ﬁrm’s expected






d(p,θ), θ−type’s price elasticity of demand, be elastic
for all prices between c1 and c2. T h a ti s ,f o ra l lp ∈ [c2,c 1], |η(p,q)|≥1.
This implies that in this price range, an individual will spend more on the
local good as the price of this good decreases. So for every p ∈ [c2,c 1],
c1d(c1,θ) ≤ pd(p,θ).
Given q,l e tp(q)=m i n {p :( p−c2)ED(p,q)−NF =0 } denote the min-
imum price such that proﬁts are equal to zero under the second technology.
Then, p(q) satisﬁes the condition: p(q)=c2 + NF
ED(p(q),q). Since ED(p;q)i s
increasing in q, clearly p(q) is decreasing in q,t h a ti s ,p  < 0.
The crux of this paper lies in the idea that demand uncertainty may breed
ineﬃciency, and this has two parts. First, in the absence of information
ﬁrms are unwilling to invest in the more productive technology t2, due to
insuﬃcient expected demand. Second, we need to allow for the possibility
that this decision is ineﬃcient, that is, if expected demand were suﬃciently
(and feasibly) high, the ﬁrm would have optimally chosen t2. These two ideas
are, respectively, captured in the following two assumptions: (i) p(q) >c 1
and (ii) there exists a   q ∈ (q,1) s.t. p(  q)=c1.7 The ﬁrst assumption simply
says that when the expected proportion of high types is q (the unconditional
expectation), a ﬁrm pricing at average cost must charge a price above c1 if it
chooses t2. We saw earlier that p  < 0. The second assumption therefore says
that there exists a feasible proportion of high-types (  q)a b o v ew h i c haﬁ r m
pricing at average cost can charge a lower price under the second technology
than it can under the ﬁrst.
7These assumptions would have to be modiﬁed under alternative market structures. For
example, under Bertrand competition, the ﬁrst assumption would have to be p(
q
2) >c 1.
The actual structure of the assumptions is, however, only important insofar as it captures
the idea of potential ineﬃciency arising from uncertainty.
73 Game without local currency
The game without local currency goes as follows. At the beginning of the
period, nature reveals to each individual his type. This is private information;
only the distribution of player types is common knowledge. The local ﬁrm
then chooses a technology (t) and price (p). Consumers observe prices and
decide how much of the local good to buy (d(p,θ)). Finally, production and
consumption take place.
An equilibrium of the game without local currency is a strategy for each
consumer and a strategy (t,p) for the local ﬁrm. The consumer’s strategy
in this game is simple: they simply demand d(p,θ) of the local good (and
spend the remainder of their income on the national good). The ﬁrm’s strat-
egy follows from the three features of perfect contestability: (i) an entrant
incurs no sunk costs of entry, (ii) an entrant is able to begin serving before
an incumbent can change its price and (iii) entrants and incumbents have
identical access to extant technologies. These three conditions eﬀectively im-
pose a zero-proﬁt condition on the ﬁrm’s side, hence inducing a downward
sloping price expansion path. This, coupled with consumers’ strategies gives
rise to Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 Under p.c.m., a ﬁrm which chooses t = t1 must charge p = c1.
Proof. Suppose p>c 1. Then, another ﬁrm could enter the market, under
cut the price, and drive this producer out of business; p<c 1 implies
Eπ(p) < 0, which is strictly dominated by Eπ(c1)=0 .
Lemma 2 Under p.c.m., a ﬁrm which chooses t = t2 must charge p = p(q)
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 1
3.1 Equilibrium of the game without local currency
Lemmas 1 and 2 give rise to the following equilibrium strategies for the ﬁrm
and the consumers in the absence of a local currency.




Proof. Suppose not; suppose the ﬁrm chose t2. Then, from lemma 2, and
given that q = q , we know that p = p(q) >c 1. So, from lemma 1, an
entrant could choose t1 and proﬁtably under cut the ﬁrm, leaving it with a
loss of NF.
This proposition says that when a ﬁrm’s only information regarding types
is that the Prob(θ = θH)=q, it will choose the less productive technology t1
and charge the high price c1. This equilibrium may be regarded as a “low-
level equilibrium” in the sense that productivity and demand are lower, and
prices, higher than they would be under technology 2.
However, the equilibrium may or may not be eﬃcient in the ex-post sense.
If the realised number of high-types in the economy is K<  qN, then the
choice of technology (t1) is ex-post eﬃcient. If, however, K ≥   qN, t2 would
Pareto dominate t1, with the ﬁrm at least as well oﬀ and consumers strictly
better oﬀ. The potential ex-post ineﬃciency arises on account of the ﬁrm’s
uncertainty regarding the distribution of consumer types, which in turn de-
termines aggregate demand for their product. As we argue in the following
section, the introduction of a local currency may actually allow consumers
to signal their type costlessly, thereby allowing ﬁrms and consumers to coor-
dinate on an equilibrium which is eﬃcient both in the expected and ex-post
sense.
4 Game with local currency
Now suppose that individuals have the option of holding a local currency,
expendable only on local goods, and hence, serving as a signal of demand
to local ﬁrms. The game with local currency runs as follows. First, nature
reveals types. Each individual privately observes his type and then decides
9what portion of his (initially dollar) wealth to hold in local currency (m).They
then go to the monetary authority and convert this portion into m at a ﬁxed
exchange rate. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume
this rate to be 1:1. Once converted, their local currency holdings cannot be
reconverted into dollars and can only be spent on the purchase of local goods.
The local ﬁrm observes the aggregate amount of local currency holdings (M).
It then updates its beliefs regarding the aggregate number of θH-types in the
economy and decides on a (p,t) combination. Individuals observe prices and
decide how much of the local good to buy. Market transactions then take
place. At the end of the period, ﬁrms (but not consumers) can go to the
monetary authority and redeem their local currency holdings for dollars.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with local currency consists
of a strategy for each consumer and a strategy and beliefs for the ﬁrm which
satisfy the following properties. First, each consumer’s strategy is optimal
given other consumers’ strategies and the ﬁrm’s beliefs and strategy. Second,
the ﬁrm’s strategy is optimal given beliefs and consumers’ strategies. Finally,
beliefs are consistent.
As with most Bayesian games, this one has multiple equilibria, some
of which are more reasonable than others. For example, there exists an
equilibrium in which the ﬁrm believes that #θH =0w h e nM ≤ Nw,n oo n e
holds local currency, and the ﬁrm employs the high marginal cost technology.
Given that individuals can only spend local currency on local goods, beliefs
such as these seem somewhat unreasonable.
To capture the idea that ﬁrms recognise that local currency must be spent
on local products, therefore, we restrict our attention to beliefs which satisfy
the following simple monotonicity property.8 Let α(M) denote the ﬁrm’s pos-
terior regarding the number of θH-types in the economy. Then, monotonicity
implies that α(M ) ≥ α(M) for all M  >M ,w i t hα(M ) >α (M)f o rs o m e
M  >Mwhere M,M  ∈ [0,wN]. In other words, observing a larger aggre-
gate local currency holding cannot induce the ﬁrm to think that at any given
8This reﬁnement is used in a diﬀerent context in Coate and Morris (1995).
10price p>0, it will face a lower expected demand; furthermore, over some
range of local currency holdings, the ﬁrm’s beliefs regarding the proportion
of high types in the economy is strictly increasing in M. The monotonic-
ity assumption yields a unique equilibrium to the game with local currency,
which has particularly intuitive properties, a couple of which coincide nicely
with the characteristics of extant local currency systems.
4.1 Equilibrium of the game with local currency
Consider the problem of a consumer i of type θj. She must decide how
much of her wealth to hold in local currency (mi(θj)), and how much of the
local good to consume (xi(p,m)). When the ﬁrm has monotone beliefs, the
consumer knows that holding more local currency may convince the ﬁrm that
there are enough high types to choose t2 and charge a lower price. However,
the danger in holding local currency is that at any given price p,s h em a yb e
stuck with more of the local currency than she would optimally like to spend
on the local good. This problem would be overcome if the consumer held
the minimum amount she would spend on the local good irregardless of the
ﬁrm’s technology choice and other consumers’ strategies or, more precisely,
an amount:
mi(θj)= m i n
p∈[c1,c2]
pd(p,θj)( 1 )
Since |η(p,q)|≥1 for all p ∈ [c2,c 1], we know that mi(θj)=c1d(c1,θ j).
That is, the consumer’s strategy is to hold that amount which she would
spend on the local good if the ﬁrm were to stick to the less productive tech-
nology; notice that m(θH) >m (θL)s i n c ed(p,θH) >d (p,θL). If a consumer
follows this money holding strategy, then her local goods consumption will
be:




11Given that individuals are following this strategy, aggregate money hold-
ings in the economy are M =
 N
i=1 mi(θj)=Km(θH)+( N − K)m(θL),
where K is the number of high-types in the economy. The ﬁrm knows the
aggregate local money holdings in the economy and, in equilibrium, beliefs
must be consistent with consumers’ strategies.9 Therefore, re-arranging this
equation and solving for K, the ﬁrm’s (equilibrium) beliefs regarding the





Hence, if m(θL)a n dm(θH) denote low- and high-type consumers’ equilib-
rium money-holding strategies, in observing the aggregate money holdings
in the community the ﬁrm will be able to perfectly intuit the aggregate
number of high-types in the economy. It is in this manner, therefore, that
holding local currency signals demand. Let   K =   qN be the critical num-
ber of high-types above which a ﬁrm will be induced to choose t2 and let
  M = m(θH)  K+m(θL)(N−  K). Then, the ﬁrm’s equilibrium price-technology
strategy is then very straight forward given its beliefs and consumers’ strate-









N ),t 2)i f M ≥   M
(4)
In other words, if a ﬁrm sees “enough” local money in the community
(M ≥   M), it will choose the more productive technology and charge a lower
price. Otherwise, it will resort to the less productive technology. Proposition
2 describes equilibrium strategies and beliefs formally.
9In Ithaca, information regarding the aggregate local money holdings is explicitly pro-
vided in a bi-monthly newspaper called “Hour Town”.
12Proposition 2 If N is suﬃciently large, in a game with local currency the
following is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with monotonic beliefs:
(i) Consumer i’s money-holding and local goods consumption strategies
are described by (1) and (2) respectively, where i ∈{ 1,...N} and
j ∈{ L,H}.
(ii) The ﬁrm’s price-technology strategy is given by (4)
(iii) The ﬁrm’s beliefs are of the form described in (3)
Proof. Given consumers’ strategies and the beliefs outlined in (i) and
(iii), the ﬁrm’s equilibrium strategy follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 and
Proposition 1. Furthermore, given a money-holding strategy, consumer’s
local goods consumption follows naturally. Consider consumer i’s
money-holding strategy.
First consider a deviation to the left: m  ∈ [0,m(θ)). Let
M  = M − (m(θ) − m ). For an individual of type-θ, there exist three
possibilities.
(1) α(M ) ≥   K.
In this case, the ﬁrm chooses t2 regardless of the individual’s deviation.
Average cost pricing and the monotonic beliefs property (m.b.p.) mean,
however, that the individual stands to face a higher price, leaving him
strictly worse oﬀ holding m  rather than m(θ).
(2) α(M) <   K ⇒ α(M ) <   K under m.b.p.
Here, the ﬁrm always chooses t1 and charge c1, so the individual is
indiﬀerent between holding m(θ)a n dm .
(3) α(M) ≥   K and α(M ) <   K.
That the individual will induce a switch from t2 to t1 and hence face a
higher price is a positive probability event for any m  <m (θ). Such an
action would therefore make the deviator strictly worse oﬀ. Given that the
13individual is indiﬀerent in case 2, but strictly worse oﬀ under cases 1 and 3,
under m.b.p., the individual will never have an incentive to deviate to a
lower m(θ).
Now, consider a deviation to the right: m  ∈ (m(θ),w]. Without loss of
generality, normalise m(θL)=0a n dm(θH) = 1. We ﬁrst introduce some
notation. Let vj(p)=u(d(p,θj),w− pd(p,θj)) be a type-θj consumer’s
indirect utility at his optimal consumption bundle at price p.L e t
vj(p,m)=u(xj(p,m),w− pxj(p,m)), be a type-θj consumer’s maximum
possible utility at price p when he holds m units of the local currency, where
as before, xj(p,m)=m a x {d(p,θj), m
p }.N o t i c et h a tvj(p) ≥ vj(p,m) ∀ m,p.
Finally, let δj(p,m)= v j(p,m) − vj(p). Clearly, δj(p,m) ≤ 0.
Consider a θH-type’s incentive to deviate to m  ∈ (m(θ),w]. (An analogous
argument works for a θL-type, so we omit it here.) Let [  K − m ]b et h e
biggest integer smaller than (  K − m ), and let s =# θH. Then with i.i.d.
types, there are three possible states. In the ﬁrst, the ﬁrm always chooses
technology 1 and charges p = p(α(M)) = p(α(M )) = c1. In the second,
holding m  ∈ (m(θ),w] may induce the ﬁrm to switch from technology 1 to
technology 2 and charge
p = p(α(M
 )) = c2+
NF
α(M )d(p(α(M )),θ H)+( N − α(M ))(d(p(α(M )),θ L))
.
In the third, the ﬁrm always chooses technology 2 and charges
p = p(α(M
 )) = c2+
NF
α(M )d(p(α(M )),θ H)+( N − α(M ))(d(p(α(M )),θ L))
State 1: #θH ≤   K − m  with probability
ρ1 =
 [  K−m]−1
s=0





State 2:   K − m  < #θH ≤   K − 1 with probability
14ρ2 =
   K−2
s=[  K−m]−1














Let   K = aN where a ∈ (0,1) and let B(r) be the beneﬁts to the deviator
when the state of the world is r. Then, B(1) = δH(c1,m  ) < 0s i n c e
m  >m (θH)=c1d(c1,θ), and B(3) = (vH(p(α(M ),m  )−
vH(p(α(M ))) < = > 0. In State 2, holding m  ∈ (m(θ),w] induces the ﬁrm to
switch from technology 1 to technology 2. The beneﬁt to the deviator in
this state is B(2) = (vH(p(α(M ),m  ) − vH(c1)) < = > 0.The total expected
net beneﬁt from deviating is therefore:
EB(r)=ρ1B(1) + ρ2B(2) + ρ3B(3)
The ﬁrst expression is always negative, and the last two have ambiguous
sign. At worst, B(2),B(3) > 0. However, as N gets large, ρ3,ρ 2 → 0a n d
ρ1 → 1. So, EB(r) → EB(1) < 0. Therefore, for large N, the individual
has no incentive to deviate to m  ∈ (m(θ),w].
Finally, check that beliefs are correct in equilibrium (they are).
Remark The equilibrium with monotonic beliefs described in proposition 2
is unique.
This proposition and the remark above together say that in the unique
equilibrium of the game with local currency, each individual holds the min-
imum amount they will spend on the local good– regardless of what tech-
nology is eventually chosen – in the local currency. Firms, having observed
the aggregate level of local currency holdings, perfectly infer the number of
θH-types in the economy.
15Consumers’ equilibrium strategies are driven by the monotonicity of be-
liefs, which captures the idea that ﬁrms recognise the signalling potential of
local money holdings. On one end, monotonic beliefs ensure that holding
less than the minimum is a weakly dominated strategy. However, this be-
comes problematic at the other end. Although the individual never has an
incentive to hold this amount in state 1, by this very property, individuals
may be induced to hold more than their minimum in order to either lower
prices in state 3 or induce a technology switch with lower prices in state 2.
However, if N is big, the probability of being in the ﬁrst state (in which you
make a certain loss by over-holding) is big compared to the probability of
being in states 2 or 3.10 Therefore, the net beneﬁt of deviations to the right
is negative. It is precisely this logic which gives rise to the uniqueness of this
equilibrium. For each consumer i, monotonicity rules out money holdings to
the left of the minimum, and as we just saw, for suﬃciently large N,m o n e y
holdings larger than the minimum are ruled out as well.11
The equilibrium described in proposition 2 has several appealing proper-
ties. First, a symmetric equilibrium arises naturally from the consumers’
strategies, considerably simplifying the construction of the ﬁrm’s beliefs.
Second, as mentioned in the introduction, casual intuition suggested that
holding local currency is a weakly dominated strategy – dollars can be used
10This is akin to the voting literature in that with large N, the probability of being
pivotal in aﬀecting the outcome is small.
11We believe the demand elasticity assumption to be an accurate representation of
reality, since the goods typically sold in these markets are low-priced luxuries such as
candles, honey and pottery. However, it is technically non-trivial since it ensures that the
minimum holding is attained at expenditures under technology 1. If this were not the case
– if the minimum is hit at expenditure under technology 2 instead – then the following
problem would arise. We know that the beneﬁts from holding more than the minimum in
this case are strictly negative in state 3. As N becomes large, the probability of being in
state 3 goes to zero faster than the probability of being in state 2 (and earning a potentially
positive beneﬁt). Although being in states 2 or 3 becomes a zero measure event as N goes
to inﬁnity, one can no longer rule out the possibility that there exist proﬁtable deviations
greater than the minimum at technology 2 expenditure.
16to buy both national and local goods whereas local currency can only be
used towards the purchase of the local good. However, a local currency
has a supplementary attribute over and above being a unit of exchange: it
serves a signal of demand for local products. Monotonicity coupled with the
min-strategy therefore turns conventional intuition on its head, making the
holding local currency a weakly dominant strategy over a certain range.
Third, eﬃciency arises even when individuals are following a particularly
pessimistic strategy. In many coordination games, eﬃciency arises when
players shoot for the moon at a potential cost, and this optimistic strategy
becomes self-fulﬁlling. Here, people are acting in such a manner that even
if the ﬁrm does not charge the lower price, they will not be hurt by their
chosen strategies.
Fourth, individuals who are more keen about local goods hold larger
amounts of the local currency; this is widely observed in practice. Finally,
the equilibrium captures the fact that the actual amount of local currency
in circulation tends to be small.12 In this model, this could be explained by
a combination of low demand for the local good at current prices as well as
consumers’ min-strategies.
5 Alternative Policies
The introduction of a local currency provides individuals with an instrument
to signal their demand for local goods; it essentially acts as a demand rev-
elation mechanism. In the equilibrium we have constructed, such a signal
is perfectly revealing and can have one of two consequences. When the lo-
cal ﬁrm’s posteriors are suﬃciently high, it switches to a more productive
technology, charging a lower price. When they are suﬃciently low, the ﬁrm
stays with the less productive technology – the one they would have cho-
12In Ithaca, the total amount of local money in circulation amounts to a mere 64,000
USD. However, this amount is not an insigniﬁcant part of the local economy; on any given
day at the farmer’s market, 5 to 20 per cent of trade takes place in Ithaca Hours.
17sen in the absence of any signal. In equilibrium, ﬁrms earn zero expected
proﬁts, so, since they are risk neutral, ﬁrms are certainly no worse oﬀ under
a local currency regime. By holding what they would spend on the local
good anyway, consumers are never worse oﬀ when demand is revealed to be
low. Furthermore, they are strictly better oﬀ when demand is revealed to be
high. In the equilibrium we have constructed, therefore, the introduction of
a local currency therefore always leads to a Pareto improvement: eﬃciency
is enhanced in both an ex-ante and an ex-post sense.13
Ex-post optimality arises because in this equilibrium, the introduction
of a local currency eﬀectively induces truth-telling. Needless to say, the
introduction of a local currency is not the only demand revelation mechanism
available to policy makers. It would be instructive, therefore, to see how this
policy compares to other demand revelation mechanisms a government may
resort to.
Here, we consider two alternative mechanisms. The ﬁrst is an especially
obvious candidate: the government could simply go out and ask each indi-
vidual what their type is. In such a survey, high types would clearly not have
an incentive to lie – they stand to suﬀer a higher price if they do. However,
for exactly the opposite reason, low types certainly do have an incentive to
lie. Consequently, a simple survey is not going to induce individuals to reveal
their types truthfully. Since all low types will claim to be high types, any
survey must therefore be accompanied by an incentive for truth-telling.
This brings us to the second alternative. Suppose that rather than intro-
duce a local currency, local goods production is organised in the public sector
and the government pursues the following policy. First, it asks individuals
to reveal their type. On the presumption that announcements are true, the
government then chooses the appropriate technology in precisely the same
manner as the ﬁrm did previously. In particular, it selects t1 and charges a
13Note that by imposing a zero-proﬁt condition, the market structure we adopt allows
us to talk unambiguously about Pareto improvements. With other market structures we
would have to consider more conventional measures such as surplus maximisation.
18price p = c1 if the proportion of self-declared θH-types (r = R
N)i sl e s st h a n  q;
it chooses t2, setting p =m i n ( AC(t2;r)), otherwise. Trade then takes place
at this price. If demand realisations are at variance with the anticipated de-
mand, any proﬁts or losses incurred by the government-producer are passed
on to consumers in the form of lump-sum transfers or taxes, τ.
This policy, in eﬀect, imposes a balanced budget constraint on the gov-
ernment. The restriction serves a dual purpose. First, it guarantees that the
ﬁrm will earn zero-proﬁts, thereby facilitating Pareto comparisons in equilib-
rium under this policy. Second, it enforces a discipline on punishment which
may otherwise be taken to extremes in order to induce the desired (eﬃcient)
outcome in equilibrium. For example, the government could ask individuals
to reveal their types and then kill everyone if observed demand were not in
accordance with announcements. In equilibrium, then, all individuals would
tell the truth, but such a policy is simply not reasonable. In analysing this
policy, closed form solutions are intractable, so we consider a simple example
instead.
5.1 An Example
Consider an economy comprising 100 individuals (N = 100) with linear de-
mand functions of the form d(p,θ)=θ − p,w h e r e( θH,θL)=( 1 2 ,8).14 Let
each individual’s wealth be w = 60 and let the probability of an individual
being of type θH be q =0 .45. Then, if F =0 .8, c1 =0 .62 and c2 =0 .6,
  q =0 .5. Let ai denote person i’s announcement of his type, where ai =1i f
he announces that he is a high type, and ai = 0 if he announces that he is
a low type. Then, R =
 
i ai is the total number of individuals announcing
high types and let r = R
N.L e t ED(p;R)=Rd(p,θH)+( N − R)d(p,θl)
denote the expected demand for the local product following individuals’ an-
nouncements of types, under the presumption that individuals are telling the
truth. We know that when r<0.5, the government will choose technology
14A utility function of the form u(l, n; θ)=
1−(θ−l)
2
2 + n would, for example, produce
such a demand function.
191 and set a price p(R)=0 .62 ; and when r ≥ 0.5 it will choose technology 2
and set a price p(R)=0 .6+ NF
ED(p;R).L e tπ(R,K) denote the government’s
(realised) proﬁts when R individuals announce that they are θH-types and
K individuals act like θH-types. Then, under the policy outlined above,
the government’s total tax/transfer bill will be: τ(R,K)=π(R,K), where
π(R,K)=N[(K
Nd(p(R),θ H)+( 1− K
N)d(p(R),θ L))(p(R) − 0.6) − 0.8] when
R>50 and π(R,K) = 0 otherwise. Clearly, whenever R>K , π(R,K) ≤ 0
and when R<K ,π (R,K) ≥ 0.
What we are really interested in is whether a given tax schedule will
induce truth-telling (K = R). In order to answer this question, we need to
determine whether there exist proﬁtable deviations from truth-telling. This
means that we can restrict our attention to two cases: (i) R = K +1 a n d
(ii) R = K − 1. The ﬁrst case pertains to a θL-type pretending to be a θH-
type. The second case pertains to a θH-type pretending to be a θL-type. Let
vi(p(R),θ −j|θj)=u(d(p(R),θ j),w− p(R)d(p(R),θ j)) + τi(R,K)d e n o t et h e
net beneﬁt of lying for an individual i of type θj. Then, if Evi(p(R),θ −j|θj) >
Evi(p(R),θ j|θj), at y p eθj will be better oﬀ lying when others are telling the
truth.
First consider the case in which the government targets any taxes or
transfers directly to the deviator. That is, if i deviates whilst everyone else
tells the truth, τi(R,K)=π(R,K)a n dτ−i(R,K)=0 .
Net Beneﬁt to a High-type deviating under targeted transfers.As
we can see in ﬁgure 1, a high type has no incentive to deviate in any state
of the world (i.e. for any K). For K ≤ 50, the deviation does not cause
any change in price and the government earns zero proﬁts. Hence, in this
range, there is no tax or transfer. For K>50, the net beneﬁt (positive
transfer from government’s proﬁts, less the utility loss from a higher price)
is negative. Thus, the expected beneﬁt from lying is negative.
Net Beneﬁt to a Low-type deviating under targeted transfers.Similarly,
as ﬁgure 2 indicates, a low type has no incentive to deviate from truth-telling
20either.
The targeted tax/transfer policy therefore induces truth-telling. How-
ever, in order to carry out this policy, the government must be able to
track both announcements and individual demands, and this is a rather
extravagant requirement. In its absence, the government would need to re-
sort to an aggregate rather than individual-level indicator in formulating its
tax/transfer scheme. One such policy is a simple head-tax/transfer of the
form τi(R,K)=
π(R,K)
N for all i. Figures 3 and 4 depict the incentives for
deviation under this policy.
Net Beneﬁt to a High-type deviating under a head-tax.The costs
incurred by high-type deviating from truth-telling are magniﬁed when the
government institutes a per-capita rather than a targeted transfer. Conse-
quently, as seen in ﬁgure 3, the expected beneﬁt from lying continues to be
negative.
Net Beneﬁt to a Low-type deviating under a head-tax.As ﬁgure 4
shows, a low-type has no incentive to deviate when K ≤ 50. However, unlike
the case of a targeted tax, a low type actually does have an incentive to
deviate under a head-tax when K>50. Thus, the expected beneﬁt from
lying is positive.
How do the two policies outlined above compare to equilibrium of the
currency policy discussed in the previous section? Pursuing a “min” strategy
in the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 2 leads to full revelation. In this
sense, it is analogous to truth-telling under the two policies considered above.
As we saw earlier, it is never proﬁtable for an individual to hold less than his
minimum money holdings. Figures 5 and 6 describe net beneﬁts of deviating
to the right. In particular, we consider what incentive the individual might
have to deviate from holding m = c1d(c1,θ)t om  = m + ε,w h e r eε =0 .01.
Net Beneﬁt of High-type deviating under Local Currency.As ﬁgure
215 indicates, a high-type individual has a positive incentive to deviate from a
min-strategy for K>50. However, when K ≤ 50, deviation entails a loss.15
Therefore, when N = 100 and q =0 .45, under the binomial distribution, the
net beneﬁt from deviating is negative.16
Net Beneﬁt of Low-type deviating under Local Currency.Figure 6
paints much the same picture as ﬁgure 5. Analogously, net expected beneﬁts
are negative and the low-type individual has no incentive to deviate from his
min-strategy.17
5.2 Discussion
In the model we considered in Section 4, local currency holdings resulted in
full revelation of demand and consequently, a Pareto optimal outcome. As
this example demonstrates, it is possible to obtain the same result from a
targeted transfer. Under such a policy, any given individual contemplating
a unilateral deviation from truth-telling faces a trade oﬀ between a price
diﬀerence on the one hand and transfers or tax on the other. In this ex-
ample, for high (low) types, the former (latter) eﬀect dominates. Although
this sounds promising, it is important to recognise that a targeted policy
has lavish book-keeping requirements. In order to enforce such a policy,
the government must keep a record of names on both announcements and
transactions. This promises to be an extremely complex, not to mention
expensive, undertaking – arguably more so than printing local money.
15A cursory look at ﬁgure 5 provides the basic intuition. Suppose the net beneﬁt is
4 × 10−6 for all K>50 and the loss, −1 × 10−6 for K ≤ 50. Then, in order for the
expected beneﬁt to be positive, it must be the case that Pr(K>50) ≥ 0.2. However,
under the binomial distribution with N = 100 and q =0 .45, Pr(K>50) = 0.135 < 0.20.
16These results are for an epsilon-deviation. When a high-type individual holds enough
extra money to convince the ﬁrm that there is one additional high type in the economy
(i.e. K + 1 high-types), net beneﬁts are lower than −8 for all 0 ≤ K ≤ 100.
17When a low-type individual holds enough extra money to convince the ﬁrm that there
is one additional high type in the economy (i.e. K + 1 high-types), net beneﬁts are lower
than −7 for all 0 ≤ K ≤ 100.
22Once you move to a less exacting system of taxation based on aggregate
indicators, however, you lose the truth-telling equilibrium. In particular,
when a targeted tax is substituted with a head tax, low-types now have an
incentive to announce that they are high-types because they continue to reap
the beneﬁt of the resultant price reduction, while bearing only a fraction of
the tax costs. In the equilibrium described in Proposition 2, however, a
local currency policy essentially succeeds where the head-tax fails; ﬁrms are
able to divine the number of high-types in the economy simply by observing
aggregate money-holdings in the economy (M).
Besides being relatively inexpensive to administer and having minimal
book-keeping requirements, local currency has the additional appeal of being
decentralised and self-enforcing. The government’s only function is to play
the role of the monetary authority, printing and exchanging local currency.
It need not worry about implementing punitive measures on consumers since,
in deviating from their “min” strategy (which is analogous to truth-telling),
players impose a potential cost upon themselves in terms of sub-optimal
consumption.
6 Conclusion
In addition to the standard attributes of currency, local money serves as a
signal of demand for local goods, thereby attenuating demand uncertainty
and enhancing eﬃciency. In the equilibrium we constructed money holdings
are fully revealing, leading to ex-post optimality. Indeed, for any ﬁnite num-
ber of local ﬁrms producing a ﬁnite number of goods, this will be the case as
long as ﬁrms know d(p,θ), the vector of demands for each ﬁrm’s good.
Once we allow for more than two consumer types, however, the particu-
lar signal we considered no longer induces an information structure without
noise. This is because a ﬁrm, in observing only M, has one equation in more
than one unknown (J − 1 unknowns if there are J consumer types). Al-
though residual uncertainty would mean that ex-post eﬃciency is no longer
23assured in this case, such a signal would nonetheless be informative. The
important thing to notice is that the introduction of a local currency volun-
tarily held by optimising agents never increases ﬁrms’ demand uncertainty
and although ex-post eﬃciency is by no means guaranteed, ex-ante eﬃciency
is always (weakly) improved. At worst, posteriors and priors are identical
and at best, as in the equilibrium of the game we considered earlier, demand
is perfectly revealed.
The use of a local currency to resolve demand uncertainty is particularly
attractive in light of how little institutional involvement it entails. Indeed,
most extant currency systems have been initiated by non-governmental agen-
cies or, more commonly, by individuals. The institution’s sole role is to print
money and act as a currency exchange agency. Granted, this task involves
both the cost of printing money and a certain degree of credibility. Neither
individuals nor ﬁrms would be willing to trade in the local currency if they did
not trust the monetary authority to play the role of facilitator in an honest
manner. However, the same would be true of standard tax/transfer policies
designed to elicit truth-telling. Indeed, policies such as those discussed in
the previous section involve not only the assurance that the government
will not simply pocket any gains, but also that it will set policy in order to
enhance eﬃciency, assuming that it has taxation authority at all. These are,
if anything, a more stringent set of requirements, particularly in the context
of developing countries.
In this paper, we have focussed on the signalling value of local currency.
Local money enhances eﬃciency by serving as a signal to local producers of
the demand for their products. However, the signalling opportunities for local
currencies need not operate in this particular manner in order to promote
eﬃciency. For example, members of local currency communities often claim
that the use of a local currency cultivates a sense of community. It is not
diﬃcult to formalise this idea in a model in which national and local goods
are substitutes and consumers’ utility of local goods consumption increases
in the number of agents consuming locally.
24Such a model would essentially be a coordination game with two equilib-
ria. In the “good equilibrium”, everyone consumes locally and in the “bad
equilibrium”, nobody consumes locally. Here, holding positive amounts of
local currency would actually be a weakly dominated strategy, but in so-
doing agents may actually be able to coordinate on the “good” equilibrium
by signalling their intent to consume locally.18
The idea that the mere introduction of a local currency may give rise
greater eﬃciency and, potentially, higher productivity is disarmingly simple,
especially when compared to the types of solutions which traditionally ac-
company developing areas’ escape from low-level equilibria. For instance,
the traditional prescription for escape from a low-level equilibria stemming
from intersectoral coordination failures of the Rosenstein-Rodan type is large-
scale government investment in shared infrastructure (see Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny, 1989). Similarly, the infant industry argument is an oft-cited
resolution to ineﬃciently low entry (see Mayer, 1984).
However, there are a number of limitations to this policy. First, once
uncertainty on the part of consumers regarding their own demand for the
local good is introduced, local currency once more becomes a dominated
asset. To some extent, this explains why individuals who hold local currency
tend to be those who are well settled in the local community. More generally,
however, it does suggests that the analysis would not go through in a climate
of individual uncertainty in the absence further structure.
Second, as monetary theorists well recognise, the introduction of a new
currency is no easy matter. In focusing on the introduction of a local currency
to supplement a national one, we have skirted at least three important issues.
The ﬁrst is the level of credibility with which we have exogenously endowed
the monetary authority. Clearly, if ﬁrms did not trust the monetary authority
to redeem their local currency for dollars, this policy would never get oﬀ the
ground. The second is the wealth-creation aspect of money. Evidence among
extant local currency systems suggests that this may, in fact, be an important
18This is closely related to the literature on forward induction.
25motivation for the introduction of local currency. Any explanation for why a
national currency will not suﬃce would probably have to tell a story of a non-
information-based market failure which leads to a (dollar) cash constraint
among a subset of the population who would otherwise like to trade with
one another. Finally, there looms the issue of why people are willing to hold
money at all. At the very least, a dynamic framework would be required to
answer this broader question.
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